, the 2014 invasion of lumpy skin disease in Greece and the Balkan countries 5, 6 and the pan-European spread of Schmallenberg virus since 2011 7, 8 . These experiences have increased fears of novel infections that may threaten livestock industries in disease-free countries in the future, such as FMD, BTV, avian influenza, African swine fever, Newcastle disease, Rift Valley fever and brucellosis. Once established, there are considerable difficulties in controlling endemic diseases in the livestock industry, as exemplified by infections in the UK such as footrot 9 , scrapie 10 and bovine tuberculosis (bTB) 11, 12 . Many of these novel and endemic diseases spread easily between the animals on a farm, which are kept at relatively high densities, and can spread between farms through a mixture of airborne infection, fomites, vector transmission and animal movements 13 . Of these transmission routes, animal movements have the potential to lead to very-long-distance dispersal of infection, but can be readily prevented through emergency legislation 14 . For this reason, local, regional or national-scale movement restrictions (often banning the non-essential movement of all farm livestock) are often one of the first control policies to be adopted when an outbreak occurs 15 . Such bans have the advantage (in comparison to vaccination or other treatments) that they are independent of disease aetiology and can therefore be enacted before the causative agent has been fully identified.
The revenue of livestock farms is largely based on the movement of animals, either when selling animals to other farms or when moving animals for slaughter. Therefore, adopting any form of movement restrictions can have substantial economic consequences for the livestock industry. In the UK, a nationwide ban on animal movements and the 'closing of the countryside' during the 2001 FMD outbreak had huge economic implications for the tourism industry and the wider rural economy 16 . Here, on the basis of these extreme financial implications, and using money as a unified measure for comparing multiple consequences, we optimize infection control in terms of minimizing the economic consequences of any intervention measure. We adopt an aggregate, national economic perspective and consider the total costs of an epidemic and the associated movement controls to the livestock industry and beyond. In particular, we focus on outbreaks of FMD and BTV, and endemic bTB, which offer contrasting behaviour. FMD is characterized by extremely rapid within-farm transmission and localized airborne or fomite spread 2, 3 . BTV is a more cryptic infection, which often infects only a proportion of the animals on a farm and can spread over large distances through infected midge vectors 17 . bTB is a much slower infection, which generally infects just one or two animals on a farm; problems with control are exacerbated by poor test sensitivity 12 and potential reservoirs of infection in wildlife populations 18, 19 . Quantifying the economic impact of an animal disease and its management is complex. The economic costs of an outbreak fall into three broad categories: costs due to loss of production, control costs and wider economic costs 20 . The large-scale 2001 UK FMD outbreak provided some of the most comprehensive data available. It is estimated that this outbreak cost the UK livestock sector £3.1 billion with similar additional costs to the wider economy. However, it is acknowledged that these wider costs were more challenging to calculate as losses in one area (for example, tourism) may have led to gains in other areas of the economy 16 . In addition, economic impacts may depend in a highly nonlinear manner on the scale of an outbreak; an outbreak with a short duration may have a limited impact on farming, whereas a protracted outbreak can leave the industry unable to recover Livestock movements are essential for the economic success of the industry. However, these movements come with the risk of long-range spread of infection, potentially bringing infection to previously disease-free areas where subsequent localized transmission can be devastating. Mechanistic predictive models usually consider controls that minimize the number of livestock affected without considering other costs of an ongoing epidemic. However, it is more appropriate to consider the economic burden, as movement restrictions have major consequences for the economic revenue of farms. Here, using mechanistic models of foot-and-mouth disease, bluetongue virus and bovine tuberculosis in the UK, we compare the economically optimal control strategies for these diseases. We show that for foot-and-mouth disease, the optimal strategy is to ban movements in a small radius around infected farms; the balance between disease control and maintaining 'business as usual' varies between regions. For bluetongue virus and bovine tuberculosis, we find that the cost of any movement ban is greater than the epidemiological benefits due to the low within-farm prevalence and slow rate of disease spread. This work suggests that movement controls need to be carefully matched to the epidemiological and economic consequences of the disease, and that optimal movement bans are often of far shorter duration than allowed under existing policy.
In the event of livestock disease outbreaks or the management of endemic disease, there are economic trade-offs that need to be taken into account when considering a set of control options 22 , and the policy that is deemed to be optimal may be dependent on specific demographic characteristics and the state of the outbreak as it evolves over time [23] [24] [25] . Recently, complex economic models have been developed that capture the multitude of economic interactions that are perturbed by an infectious disease outbreak and the subsequent control measures. These have been used to calculate the economic impact of outbreaks such as FMD in the UK 26 and South America 27 , avian influenza in the Netherlands 28 and Rift Valley Fever in Kenya 29 . Here we use a simpler approach, in which the cost calculation considers the economic impacts on up to five different sectors, which are linearly dependent on different attributes of each disease. This approach is designed to enable comparisons between different policies and indicate those that are optimal in reducing outbreak costs. We recognize that this is a simplification of the true economic cost of an outbreak, especially if different controls can generate extremes of epidemic size and duration.
We use state-of-the-art mathematical models 2, 12, 30, 31 to investigate the cost effectiveness of local and regional movement control of outbreaks of FMD and BTV and the endemic dynamics of bTB in the UK. Such policies, if implemented effectively, could balance the need for containing and controlling the spread of infection with the economic incentive of maximizing business continuity for a large number of unaffected farms.
For all three diseases, we use sophisticated stochastic spatial simulations, which are matched to historical epidemiological data. These are used to address how costs (including culling, testing, loss of exports and tourism) vary with the scale and nature of movement restrictions. All simulations reflect disease-specific transmission routes and control measures. Localized high-risk (dangerouscontact) culling is implemented for FMD, a range of movement zones (protection and surveillance zones) are enforced for BTV, whereas for bTB a targeted test-and-cull policy is enacted. Further information on the formulation of the models is included in the Supplementary Information. These three infections reflect different contributions of movements to the spread of infection. In the absence of movement controls, the movement of cattle accounts for 28% (26%-31%), 4% (2%-15%) and 13% (7%-22%) of the spread of infection for FMD, BTV and bTB, respectively (95% confidence intervals are given in brackets).
For a given set of movement controls, we consider five factors that may contribute to the overall national cost of the outbreak: (1) the number (and type) of animals infected and their eventual fate; (2) the number (and type) of animals culled as part of the control; (3) the duration of the outbreak; (4) the number of movements prevented by the restrictions and (5) the amount of testing that was undertaken (for bTB only). These epidemic descriptors are used to calculate the economic losses to different sectors:
• 'Direct costs to farms' is a weighted sum of the number of animals infected or culled.
• Costs due to 'welfare culls' are proportional to the number of farm days (farms × days) during which movements are completely banned.
• Costs to the wider 'agricultural sector' are proportional to the number of animal movements that are prevented by movement restrictions.
• 'Loss of exports' is proportional to the duration of the epidemic plus a delay to achieve disease-free status.
• 'Impact on tourism' (FMD only) is proportional to the number of farm days during which movements are completely banned and is assumed to give a measure of the regions of the countryside that are closed.
• 'Testing costs' (bTB only) are proportional to the number of animals tested and include both costs to the farmer and those met by government.
The precise formulae used to calculate these costs are given in more detail in Table 1 (the implications of changes to each economic value for the optimal policies can be assessed using the Shiny app (https://livestockmovements.shinyapps.io/movement_control/)). We next consider how movement restrictions of different types can minimize the overall expected economic cost of the disease, as well as which controls minimize economic extremes (as captured by the upper 95th percentiles). We take a national perspective, minimizing the total losses to the country, including government, farmers, the wider rural economy and tourism where appropriate.
The costs associated with FMD outbreaks differ considerably depending on the scale of the movement ban and the origin of the outbreak (Fig. 1a ,b corresponds to outbreaks starting in Cumbria and Devon respectively; other regions are shown in Supplementary  Fig. 1 ). We consider the outbreak costs from multiple simulations with interventions, including culling of livestock on infected premises and on farms considered high-risk (dangerous contacts 32 ), and a localized movement ban surrounding infected premises. Figure 1a ,b shows the mean total cost (with 95% confidence intervals) broken down into five key losses: direct costs to the farm (dark blue) and impact on tourism (orange) dominate, but show opposite trends in relation to radius of movement control. We also consider extreme 'worst-case' costs (red dots) which are defined as the upper 95% prediction interval of all simulations.
For Devon (Fig. 1b) , direct farm costs predominate and the economic optimum occurs with movement bans of relatively small radii (12-38 km, horizontal black bar); for radii below this optimum, the scale of potentially extreme worst-case costs (red dots) increases, and thus small-scale bans are far less effective. Even if the effects of tourism are ignored and we focus only on costs to the whole agricultural sector, there is still an optimal radius, although this increases to (42-48 km, horizontal blue bar). Finally, if the main concern is mitigating worst-case costs, the optimal radius is larger than when considering the mean (22-48 km, horizontal red bar).
For Cumbria, the patterns are subtly different. Due to higher densities of livestock, outbreak sizes and hence direct costs remain . Stacked (coloured) bars represent the different costs: direct farm losses (direct), welfare losses (welfare), losses to the general agricultural sector (agriculture), lost revenue due to export bans (exports) and the losses to the tourism industry (tourism) (as quantified in Table 1 ). Red dots (with confidence intervals from bootstrapping) represent the upper 95% prediction interval of the costs. Horizontal bars show the optimal movement-ban radius to minimize different economic measures: black bar, average total costs; blue bar, average cost without tourism losses; red bar, the upper 95% prediction interval. c,d, Bluetongue outbreaks initiated in Devon. c, The mean outbreak cost with variation of both the inner radius within which movements are completely banned (colours) and the protection and surveillance zones where only outward movements are banned (grouped on the x axis). Each stacked bar shows costs divided into categories as in a and b. d, Analysis focused on the protection and surveillance zones, using the same format as graphs in a and b. e,f, Results for bovine tuberculosis. Simulations are run for 14 yr with alternative movement controls and testing implemented for the last 6 yr and the costs are averaged across all years of alternative control. e, Means, extremes and the associated confidence intervals, using the same format as in a and b. f, The epidemiological consequences of alternative control policies, introduced from year zero, showing the incidence of new infections (with confidence intervals from bootstrapping) that we note can be very different from the number of detected infections owing to both test sensitivity and spatial patterns of testing.
relatively high even when movement restrictions are enacted nationally. This implies that the total costs associated with national control are higher than those when there are no movement restrictions; it may be more cost effective to allow all movements rather than to ban all movements. For Cumbria, the optimal radius for movement bans is more tightly defined compared with Devon, where there is more stochastic variability: the optimal ban radius for mean total costs is around 20 km; this increases to 52-63 km when tourism costs are excluded, whereas when mitigating worst-case costs, the optimal radius reduces to just 7.5-13 km. For BTV, the potential control options are very different. Culling has very little impact and has therefore not been used as a practical control measure. In addition, while the 2001 (and 2007) FMD epidemics led to national movement bans, the 2007 BTV outbreak was controlled by the establishment of localized zones around infected areas, where movements from higher risk to lower-risk zones were banned. Mirroring this strategy, we focus on the optimal generation of three zones: an inner zone with a complete movement ban, a high-risk protection zone and an outer lower-risk surveillance zone. All farms within the inner zone are completely banned from moving livestock either off-farm or on-farm. Livestock movements are not completely restricted for farms within either the protection zone or surveillance zone; however, livestock could not be moved from a farm in a higher risk zone to a farm in a lower-risk zone.
Our results focus on outbreaks initiating in Devon (although results are qualitatively generic; see Supplementary Figure 2 for outbreaks in Suffolk, where the 2007 outbreak started), which are generally larger due to a combination of warmer summers and higher host density necessary for sustained transmission. Figure 1c compares five different radii for the complete movement ban and four combinations of protection and surveillance zones (x axis). We consistently find that not having a complete ban (purple) outperforms all other strategies from an economic perspective, irrespective of the size of the protection zone and surveillance zone. In part, this is due to rapidly increasing losses, due to tourism, to the wider agricultural sector and welfare as the number of farms experiencing a complete ban increases; these results hold even when the effect on tourism is ignored. Figure 1d focuses on the optimal radii for the protection and surveillance zone where there is no complete ban of movement around infected farms-assuming that the surveillance-zone radius is twice that of the protection zone. For BTV (and assuming no complete bans), only the direct costs to farms (blue) and agricultural sector losses (green) affect the economic costs. We note that agricultural sector losses increase with the radii of the two zones, but the epidemic size (and hence direct costs to farms) is largely independent of movement bans, leading to the situation where it is optimal to allow free movement of livestock. Our model prediction of ineffectiveness of movement bans in controlling BTV broadly agrees with another UK BTV transmission-modelling study 33 , in which movement bans were found to have a limited impact on controlling farm-to-farm spread even without the ancillary consideration of economic impact.
Finally, for endemic bTB, we consider the impact of a combined movement ban and testing protocol, such that in addition to the standard (test-and-cull) policy, once a farm tests positive, all surrounding farms within a given radius are also placed under a cattleonly movement ban until they clear a subsequent test within 60 d. As such, waves of testing and cattle movement bans can propagate through highly infected regions. A scenario is also considered in which no movement controls are imposed, even when infected animals are detected (and culled). We consistently find that this nomovement-ban policy has the lowest economic costs (Fig. 1e) , as it eliminates the costs to the agricultural sector that arise from movement restrictions, and that bans with larger radii are increasingly costly. An alternative policy that only bans movements from infected farms but still generates tests within a given radius has a local minimum cost at a radius of around 2 km (Supplementary Figure 3) . The economically optimal policy, however, leads to a long-term increase in the number of infected cattle (Fig. 1f) , whereas largeradii ban-and-test strategies are predicted to lead to far lower incidence. We note that there is relatively little difference in incidence between the no-ban strategy and the current policy of only banning movements from infected farms (0 km).
The results for both BTV and bTB contrast with the findings for FMD. This may be explained by the different within-farm dynamics of the infections. Given that FMD is directly transmitted and highly infectious, any movement of an infected animal into a naive farm leads to rapid infection of all livestock on the farm; movements are therefore extremely detrimental. By contrast, BTV is transmitted by vectors; thus, infection can readily escape the farm environment through movement of vectors. In addition, the weakly transmissible nature of both bTB and BTV means that there is only limited saturation (density-dependent effects) of infection on farms; this means that the movement of an infected animal simply transfers the risk of infection to animals on the new farm rather than on the farm of origin.
The economic parameters used in this study (Table 1 ) are based on government agency assessments of national costs associated with each disease. However, such parameters are open to different interpretations and will be influenced by both the scale of the outbreak and the current economic climate. In addition, different organizations may have different perspectives and may focus on losses to particular sectors, such as the farming industry or government. This entire range of sensitivities can be explored with the online Shiny app (https://livestockmovements.shinyapps.io/Movement_Control/), which allows the individual economic parameters to be varied (although sensitivity to individual economic values is considered in Supplementary Figure 4) . In general, we find that the optimal movement ban radius for FMD is most sensitive to the costs of livestock and tourism losses, whereas for BTV and bTB the optimal radius only changes at extremes of economic costs.
For a policy of movement bans to be effective, it must be enforceable. There is an argument that a nationwide ban, which stops all livestock movements, could be more enforceable as it is more obvious when the ban is being broken. In addition, a regional ban may meet opposition from farmers located just within the radius of the movement ban, who view themselves as penalized relative to farmers from just outside the radius. However, localized movement bans (of the form instigated during the 2006 bluetongue epidemic) enable resources to be concentrated into a smaller region and may therefore be easier to enforce. This may be particularly the case in lower-and middle-income countries, where interventions are typically initiated at the local level in response to livestock disease outbreaks 33, 34 . Incorporating such factors into mathematical models requires the ability to predict farmer behaviour, which is likely to be complex and heterogeneous, and is beyond the scope of this work. This suite of model predictions demonstrates that movement restrictions have a substantial impact on the national cost of livestock diseases, such that large-scale movement bans are generally prohibitively expensive. By considering these three very different infections, we draw the general conclusion that movement bans are most needed for diseases like FMD, where there is considerable within-farm transmission and where movements form a dominant source of long-range transmission. For slower-spreading infections, exemplified by bTB and BTV, it may be economically preferable to allow movements to continue unrestricted. Optimization of movement restrictions-informed by bespoke predictive models-has the potential to substantially reduce the cost of an outbreak, balancing the need for control and containment with the desire to maintain the economic viability of the livestock industry.
Methods
The FMD model. The mathematical model used in this paper is a modified version of the FMD model used both during and after the 2001 outbreak by Keeling and co-workers 2, 26 to predict the spread of disease and the impact of control. Infection between farms can occur through two mechanisms: movements of infected livestock and local, distance-dependent transmission. The local transmission component of the model encapsulates the risks associated with aerosol spread and direct contact of infectious and susceptible animals or fomites (that is, contaminated vehicles or farm equipment). The rate R i,j at which an infectious farm j transmits infection to a susceptible farm i via local spread is given by:
where σ k represents the susceptibility of species k on susceptible farm i, τ l is the transmissibility of species l on farm j, N k,i is the number of animals of species k on farm i and p k and q k are power-law parameters accounting for a nonlinear increase in susceptibility and transmissibility as animal numbers on a farm increase. Previous work has found that this power-law model provides a closer fit to the 2001 data than one in which the powers are set to unity [38] [39] [40] [41] . K(d ij ) is a distancedependent transmission kernel that is estimated from contact tracing data from the 2001 outbreak 2 . In line with previous work 39 , all model parameters are estimated for five distinct regions: Cumbria, Devon, the rest of England (excluding Cumbria and Devon), Wales and Scotland. This allows the model to account for regional variation in FMD epidemiology and animal husbandry.
To assess the daily risk of between-farm infection occurring via movement of live animals, a movement network (A) is integrated into the model, mimicking the impact of animal movements from infected farms. The probability λ i of a susceptible farm i being infected by an exposed or infectious farm (E j or I j ) through a live animal movement, is given by:
Here A ji is the daily risk of movement occurring from farm j to farm i, calculated by averaging recorded cattle movements across a year; these livestock movement data were obtained from the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and the Scottish Government and have been analysed in a number of studies (for example, in refs. 14,42-44 .). As we assume that infection acts at the level of the entire farm, we are only concerned with batches of livestock movements, not the number of animals in these batches. E j and I j are indicator variables (0 or 1) that inform about the current status of farm j in the simulation.
Simulations in this paper are seeded by infecting five (randomly chosen) farms in a 5 km cluster (in a randomly chosen location) within a given county to approximate the initial conditions of a localized outbreak; detection of the first case and the implementation of controls then follows. In line with previous work, we assume that all livestock on infected premises are culled within 24 h of being reported and all associated dangerous contacts are culled within 48 h 30 . Contiguous-premises culling is not performed.
To determine the effectiveness of a livestock movement ban, we use data from the 2001 FMD epidemic that details the costs associated with the outbreak. The economic costs of the 2001 outbreak fell into five distinct categories: direct costs, indirect costs, costs associated with welfare culls, losses to the agricultural sector and losses to tourism 35 . We use this economic framework to translate our simulation results into a national epidemic cost, although alternative scenarios could be considered, such as minimizing the cost to the farming industry or to the UK taxpayer. In 2001 (and 2007) national-scale movement bans were imposed such that animals could only be moved under specific veterinary licence. Here we relax this control measure and consider a range of movement bans that act on all farms within a given radius of infected premises. We impose this radius on the basis of the straight-line distance between the recorded point location (which generally identifies the farmhouse) of each pair of farms; in practice, regional control teams would presumably account for the location of livestock, although this distinction is likely to be negligible for large radii. The parameters used in the FMD simulations are taken from matching regional prevalence from simulations to the results of the 2001 FMD outbreak (Supplementary Table 1 ).
The BTV model. Our model for BTV operates at the level of individual animals, replicating the known pattern of animal movements, and captures the transmission of infection through spatially dispersing midge vectors that are affected by climatic conditions in a similar fashion to other spatial models of BTV transmission 33, [45] [46] [47] . The model describes each farm as a stochastic metapopulation of sheep and cattle 33, 45 , the two main ruminant hosts of BTV among European commercial livestock. The livestock population at each farm i is subdivided by their species k and BTV infection status: susceptible (S k,i ), infected and infectious (I k,i ) and recovered and immune (R k,i ). The total population at each farm is assumed to remain static except for movement of infected animals and disease-induced mortality. The infectious duration for BTV in a given animal is modelled as a multi-stage Erlang process according to commonly used estimates of BTV viraemia among cattle and sheep 48 . Culicoides biting midge spatial population dynamics are described using a spatial grid overlaying the UK at 5 × 5 km resolution; each grid cell may contain 0, 1, 2 or more farms. The grid-cell locations and daily mean temperature for each cell were drawn from the UK Climate Projections retrospective data for 2007 (UKCP09) 49 , the year of the first UK BTV outbreak. The midge population in the spatial grid at coordinate location x is described by a Poisson distribution for the number of latently infected midges (E M,x ) and actively infectious midges (I M,x ). The mean of these two distributions is determined by estimating the number of bites on infected livestock within the grid and by dispersal of infected midges from nearby grids (see below). The latency duration (or extrinsic incubation period) of infected midges is modelled as a ten-stage temperature-dependent Erlang process 31, 50 . The daily number of bites emanating from the infectious midges in the grid square at location x is Poisson-distributed with mean α(t,x)I M,x , where α(t,x) is the biting rate for midges using the mean daily temperature on day t at the grid square x 31, 48 . The expected proportion of all daily infectious bites distributed to a single animal of species k in farm i within the spatial grid box at x is:
where π k is the relative preference of midges for species k and p is a parameter tuning the seeking preference of midges for larger farms within the grid cell. The sum in the denominator is over all the farms in the grid box at x. Therefore, the risk of the animal being infected on each day t is:
where P H is the probability of BTV transmission per bite from an infectious midge.
We assume that the expected number of susceptible midges arriving to bite each animal on each day is proportional to the expected prediction of a seasonal and temperature-dependent generalized linear mixed-effect model (GLMM) inferred from wide-scale midge-trapping experiments in the UK and specialized to the activity of Culicoides obsoletus females 31, 51 . Underlying GLMM random effects are drawn either once per simulation for each farm (for farm-level random effects) or daily for each farm (overdispersion and autocorrelation random effects). We denote the unscaled mean biting-rate prediction from the GLMM, conditional on local temperature and random effects for each farm on each day t, B(t,x). Therefore, the expected number of newly infected midges in the grid cell at x on day t is:
Where P V is the midge BTV infection probability per bite on an infected host and q is a parameter that scales the difference between the biting rate and the trap capture rate.
In line with the known biting behaviour of Culicoides midges 52, 53 , we assume that all biting occurs over short dusk and dawn periods and that at other times, midges are in oogenesis, seeking oviposition sites or seeking new hosts. We model the movement of midges between daily biting as an inhomogeneous diffusion process with the local diffusion rate at each grid cell x as:
where D 0 is the reference diffusivity of midges in a grid cell devoid of commercial livestock hosts and ξ is a tunable scalar. The diffusion rate for the grid cell x depends on the denominator for the proportion of bites per animal; this quantity acts as an effective population size for the grid cell. That is, we model diffusion as decreasing with more animals per grid cell and higher values of the seeking behaviour parameter. The daily number of BTV-infected animals introduced into a farm i due to livestock movement from farm j is calculated in three steps for each day: (1) for each farm pair, a movement is generated with probability A ji (see above); (2) if a movement occurs in step (1), it is chosen randomly to be a batch of sheep or cattle according the relative population density in the farm sending the batch; (3) a batch size is randomly generated according to species type and infected animals of the chosen species are sampled uniformly without replacement from the total population of the chosen species at the sending farm. Only infected animals are moved within the simulation, to better minimize population flux and in line with other simulation studies of BTV in the UK 33 .
The morbidity and mortality rates associated with BTV serotype 8 infection were low during the 2006 outbreak 17 . Therefore, we assume that the introduction of BTV into the UK is initially cryptic (occurring on 1 June 2006) and the virus spreads without movement bans until it is detected by either the death of an animal due to disease-induced mortality or detection of clinical signs of BTV among infected animals. The probability of clinical detection per farm per species per day is:
where P D,k is the daily probability of an infected animal of species k showing clinical signs of BTV. After detection of a BTV outbreak, we assume that DEFRA recommendations are followed and all farms within 15 km of the initial infected premises have all their animals investigated for BTV 54 . The initial zones (control zone, protection zone and surveillance zone) are constructed around all the detected infected premises and are extended as new infected premises are detected during the ongoing outbreak. Parameters used in the BTV model are provided in Supplementary Tables 2 and 3. The bTB model. In this paper we make use of a national-scale stochastic metapopulation model of bTB transmission and detection 12 . In essence, the model operates at the scale of individual farms, but (unlike the FMD model) captures the stochastic cattle-level infection dynamics within a farm. This is necessary, as an infected farm is likely to contain only a few infected cattle. Each farm is defined by its location and the number of susceptible, latently infected and infectious cattle present on a given day. Sheep, pigs and other livestock species are assumed to have no role in bTB transmission.
The transmission and disease-progression processes in the model are stochastic and occur in discrete time as follows: for farm i the number of susceptible (S i ), exposed (E i ) and infectious (I i ) cattle are given by: where λ is the force of infection acting on cattle within the farm (see below) and α is the rate at which latent animals become infectious. Here Λ i,t and A i,t are independent random variables chosen from binomial distributions to represent infection and the transition from latent to infectious 12 . In addition, there are three deterministic demographic processes acting on the farm-births, deaths and movements-which follow the recorded pattern from the UK's Cattle Tracing System, which is run by the British Cattle Movement Service (part of DEFRA). All three of these processes can be considered as a movement; births are movements onto a farm without an origin and deaths are movement from a farm without a destination. For all of these movements, an individual animal is chosen randomly, independent of its infection status or its history of movements. The recorded movement of around 30,000 cattle per day is one of the primary mechanisms of long-range transmission of infection from the movement of infected animals.
Transmission to cattle on a given farm comes from three different sources: cattle-to-cattle transmission, transmission from infection within the farm environment and transmission from infection within the wider environment. Hence the force of infection λ to cattle on farm i is given by:
where
is the number of cattle on farm i, v is the level of infection in the farm environment, β is the cattle-to-cattle transmission rate and V is the level of infection in the wider environment, which is considered to be the local parish 12 . The level of infection in the environment is increased by the proportion of infectious cattle, but wanes over time as the bacteria become non-viable.
These two local reservoirs of infection could both represent the persistence of infectious matter on pasture or persistence in a local wildlife reservoir. In addition, we simulate routine testing for surveillance, which follows the DEFRA rules appropriate for the time and varies between annual and four-yearly testing depending on location. This test is not perfect 55 , and we therefore use a test sensitivity of ρ for infectious cattle and ρ E × ρ for exposed or latent animals. Once infected cattle are detected in a farm, the animals are culled and the farm is placed under movement restrictions until all its cattle clear a further two tests at 60 d intervals. In addition, these farms are also subjected to further testing after 6 and 12 months.
The model parameters are inferred by matching simulations to the number of reactors (positive cattle) and number of failed herd tests recorded per county per year between 1997 and 2007 using sequential Monte Carlo approximate Bayesian computation 12 . The main parameters are given below. The model is adapted to enable us to investigate the addition of radial movement restrictions. As bTB is an endemic disease (unlike FMD and BTV), movement restrictions must be temporary, with some means by which they are lifted from given farms in the future. In our adapted model, when a herd is first identified as being infected (that is, an animal tests positive on a farm that is not under restrictions), we assume that movements from the infected farm and those within a radius of the infected farm are banned (although we also simulate the extreme case where there are no movement bans, even on the infected farms). The infected farm is subject to the usual measures, with the infected animal(s) culled and movement restrictions in place until two follow-up tests (at 60 d intervals) are all clear; additional tests at 6 and 12 months are scheduled. For those farms within the radius (which may be considered at risk due to their proximity) movements are banned until a follow-up test after 30 d can be performed; following the results of this test, movements are either resumed or the farm is identified as infected and the entire process is repeated. In this way, waves of testing spread through high prevalence areas. Results from such control policies are shown in the main text.
A modification to this control policy is explored further below. Farms with cattle testing positive are handled as described above. Farms within the surrounding radius are subject to follow-up tests but do not have their cattle movements restricted. This policy is extended to have slightly higher incidence (due to movement of cattle to new regions) but significantly lower economic costs due to the reduction in movement restrictions.
Simulations begin in 1998 and use the pattern of recorded movements and random herd-level test. Changes to the control policy (additional radial controls and testing) are assumed to begin at the start of 2005 and their impact over 6 yr on the progress of the endemic is recorded.
Data availability
The raw simulation data used to create Fig. 1 in the main text and all figures in the Supplementary Information are available from corresponding author M.J.T. on request. The authors do not have permission to share the farm-level data for the UK. However, the demographic data that includes farm locations, farm sizes and species composition, as well as the data on livestock movements between farms can be accessed via the RADAR system (e-mail: RADAR@apha.gsi.gov.uk).
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